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DISPUTES UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES RELATING TO RELIGION
ROYAL CLARENCE GILKEY*

The relationship between church and state is succinctly delineated by the first amendment's twin guarantees of religious freedom
and nonestablishment. This relationship has seldom faced the scrutiny
to which the United States Supreme Court subjected it in the case of
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral.' In this historic 1952 decision
the Court invoked the guarantees of religious freedom and nonestablishment to invalidate an attempt by the New York Legislature to
allow separationists, belonging to a movement labeled the Russian
Church in America, which had formed in opposition to the Sovietdominated parent organization in Moscow, to take over possession of
Russian Orthodox properties in New York. As the seat of the
Moscow-controlled patriarchate's authority there, Saint Nicholas
Cathedral was a prime target of a suit testing the power of the state to
decide religious controversies that are couched in terms of civil law
relationships.
Legislation had been passed by the New York legislature purporting to entitle the anti-Bolshevik separationist faction to possess
the Cathedral in question, along with other Orthodox Church property.2 A suit was instituted to eject from the Cathedral the Moscowcentered church organization whose representative was Metropolitan
Benjamin, serving the parent ecclesiastical body as Archbishop of
North America.' The objective of the separatists was to secure Saint
Nicholas Cathedral as a residence and headquarters for their chosen
leader whom a convention, or sobor, of American Orthodox churches
had elected to preside over them.
* Professor of Political Science, West Virginia University. B.A., 1941
Cornell University; A.M., 1947 Columbia University; Ph. D., 1957 University
of Minnesota.
2'344

3

U.S. 94 (1952).
N.Y. RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS LAW § 107 (McKinney 1952).

Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56, 94
N.Y.S.2d 453 (1950).
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The original defendants, occupying Saint Nicholas Cathedral by
authority of the Moscow-based parent body, won a trial court judgment that blocked an initial attempt by the American separatist group
to oust them through ejectment proceedings. Owing to a tie vote the
intermediate court affirmed the trial court's ruling. The New York
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the judgment by deciding in
favor of plaintiffs, the judges splitting 4-3 on the issues.4 It ruled that
the relevant part of New York's law on religious corporations violated
no constitutional requirements and took judicial notice of the Russian
government's exercise of effective control over the central ecclesiastical
organization of the Orthodox religion. What the New York legislature
had done was no more than a reasonable step to enable the American
churches of that faith to free themselves from the subversive influence
and atheistic taint of international communism emanating from
Moscow. The Russian Church in America could thereby maintain its
religious integrity and hold in trust the purpose of its faith. This would
prevent the political exploitation of its pulpit.'
Under these circumstances, New York might legitimately provide
for the incorporation of an autonomous body of Orthodox churches in
America to be administered independently of the central ecclesiastical
organization in Russia. Ownership of the record title to Saint Nicholas
4

In the summarizing words of David Fellman:
The New York Court of Appeals held, in a 4-3 decision, that the
prelate appointed by the ecclesiastical officials in Moscow was not
entitled to the cathedral on the basis of a 1945 state statute which
in effect brought all . . . the New York churches formerly subject
to the administrative jurisdiction of the Moscow authorities into an
autonomous North American metropolitan district.
Fellman, ConstitutionalLaw in 1952-1953, 48 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 63, 95-96
(1954).
sAs majority spokesman for the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Reed summarized the rationale behind the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals this way:
Although § 5 of the Religious Corporations Law had long controlled
religious corporations, the Court of Appeals held that its rule was
not based on any constitutional requirement or prohibition. Since
certain events of which the Court took judicial notice indicated to
it that the Russian Government exercised control over the central
church authorities and that the American church acted to protect its
pulpits and faith from such influences, the Court of Appeals felt that
the Legislature's reasonable belief in such conditions justified the
State in enacting a law to free the American group from infiltration
of such atheistic or subversive influences.
This legislation, Art. 5-C, in the view of the Court of Appeals,
gave the use of the churches to the Russian Church in America on
the theory that this church would most faithfuly carry out the purposes of the religious trust. Thus dangers of political use of church
pulpits would be minimized.
344 U.S. at 108-09.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol75/iss2/3

2

Guilkey: The Judicial Role in Intra-Church Disputes under Constitutional G
INTRA-CHURCH DISPUTES

Cathedral properly belonged to the American separatist movement,
and this disposed of the claim to possession made by the Moscow
patriarchate's representatives.
While the appeal to the United States Supreme Court was
couched in terms of the religious guarantees of the first amendment,
a dominant consideration was the inherent feeling shared by much of
the judiciary that the ejectment proceedings under judicial consideration in the Kedroff case involved a claim unamenable to settlement
without the state's interjection into an essentially religious struggle.
Courts were not unaware of the danger of state intervention in the
sectarian conflicts of a religiously pluralistic society like our own.
Hence, to the extent of their unavoidable involvement in the process
of determining conflicting civil claims asserted in court by contending
religious groups, judges were well-advised to adhere to traditionally
observed church custom and law before the occurrence of any
schismatic disruptions.6 Religious as well as temporal organizations
had a confined right of access to the courts for the determination of
their civil claims. Rival elements among the communicants of a
religion likewise could resort to secular tribunals. In response to this
right, limited though it might be, the courts owed a duty to the litigants
to reach judgment in the exercise of a marginal kind of judicial review,
and to do so within the church's construction of its own law, by which
the association of all members, including the parties in court, was to
7
be governed.
These principles governed the approach of the United States
Supreme Court to the controversy as it weighed the right to judicial
relief against the guarantee of religious liberty. Justice Reed, as
majority spokesman, stated that the state's enactment exceeded constitutional limits. The state could not take sides in an intra-church
factional dispute and favor a party by statutory arrangements. The
6 Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion asserted: "[jWhen courts
are called upon to adjudicate disputes which, though generated by conflicts of
faith, may fairly be isolated as controversies over property and therefore
within judicial competence, the authority of courts is in strict subordination
to the
7 ecclesiastical law of a particular church prior to a schism." Id. at 122.
Id. at 122. With reference to this, Justice Frankfurter cited the 1929
case of Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1
(1929). Justice Brandeis in that case defined the role of the judiciary in the
following phrase:
In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of
the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular
courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so
by contract or otherwise.
280 U.S. at 16.
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American schismatics, who wanted to free their faith from feared
subversive and atheistic influences attributable to control exerted by
a Communist government in Russia over the parent ecclesiastical
organization, could not count on secular support through legislation
to achieve their objective.
The fourteenth amendment, having absorbed the first amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion, precluded state interference in religious controversy. This controversy would have to be
fought out by the disputants without the benefit of the state's hand
tipping the scales either way. State intervention would violate the
constitutional separation of church and state. Thus, the twin first
amendment safeguards against any law establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise were invoked in applying the fourteenth
amendment to decide Kedroff adversely to the separatists.8 It remained
true that situations might arise requiring secular courts to demark
areas of state and church responsibility in the use and disposition of
property; but where property rights could be shown to be derived from
church customs or canon law, the ecclesiastical rule would control
the issue.9
What vitiated the relevant provisions of the New York law was
its attempt to regulate the administration of ecclesiastical affairs by
making them conform to the church ordinances adopted by the separatist movement. This violated the constitutional ban contained in the
first and fourteenth amendments against state interference with
freedom of religion. Such was the main thrust of Justice Reed's
opinion for the Court.
Behind this main conclusion lay other points lending strength
to Justice Reed's opinion. Sympathy for the separatists, who regarded
themselves as trustees of the true Orthodox religion, and support for
their autonomous objectives were understandable among Americans;
but there was no constitutional way to translate this favorable sentiment into legislation that would dispossess the original church and turn
8344 U.S. at 107.
9 Justice Reed concluded his opinion in these words:
Ours is a government which by the "law of its being" allows no
statute, state or national, that prohibits the free exercise of religion.
There are occasions when the civil courts must draw lines between
the responsibilities of church and state for the disposition or use of
property. Even in those cases when the property right follows as an
incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical
issues, the church rule controls. This under our Constitution necessarily follows in order that there may be free exercise of religion.
Id. at 120-21.
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its properties over to the dissident element. This was so even though
political aims of an atheistic regime were alleged to have subverted the
fundamentals of Orthodoxy. The law could reach any subversive
activity in which ecclesiastical officials might engage. When it came to
enforcing the law, clerics were no different from anybody else.' 0 In the
absence of criminal allegations, there was no basis for penalizing
church people simply because of their unpopular organizations. To
do so would deny them freedom of religion. It would encroach upon
the free exercise of whatever religion they happened to profess. Constitutional safeguards for liberty of worship barred the way to state
intervention in that area.
As authority for the Court's decision to strike down New York's
law as an unconstitutional interference with the free exercise of religion, Justice Reed relied heavily on an eighty year old precedent
involving factionalism within a church during the days of the American Civil War, Watson v. Jones."I
What gave rise to this controversy was the manifestation of an
underlying fissure within the Presbyterian Church regarding slavery.
When the Civil War broke out in 1861, the Presbyterian General Assembly took a stand against slavery, denouncing it as sinful, and
threw its moral support to the Union. Southern sympathizers inside
the church refused to go along with such an insult to their views.
Those in the Presbytery of Louisville, Kentucky protested against the
General Assembly's action and labeled it heresy. Parishioners took
sides, some of them proclaiming their loyalty to the Presbyterian
General Assembly and others renouncing their allegiance. The rebels
gained ascendancy in the Walnut Street Church in Louisville. The
loyalist faction then went into state court to challenge the pro-slavery
element. No relief was forthcoming; judgment was rendered against
the loyalists. Kentucky's judiciary decreed that the pro-slavery churchmen were legally in possession of the Walnut Street Church and
entitled to conduct its affairs.
Beaten in the state courts, the anti-slavery faction resorted to
another forum. Asserting a property interest in the Walnut Street
Church sufficient to give them standing, Unionist members instituted
10 "Legislative power to punish subversive action cannot be doubted. If
such action should be actually attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his
pulpit would be a defense. But in this case no problem of punishment for the
violation of law arises."
Id. at 109-10.
"180 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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an action in federal court under its diversity jurisdiction.'2 This meant
that the rights of the disputants, who had come into a court of the
United States as citizens of different states, would be resolved in light
of general law, instead of Kentucky's.' 3 This worked for the antislavery faction whose claim to the Walnut Street Church was ultimately vindicated when the case reached the United States Supreme
Court in 1872.
The Court pointed out that the American doctrine of separation
of church and state required secular tribunals to keep hands off controverted questions of faith. It also criticized Kentucky's Court of
Appeals for substituting its judgment for that of the highest ecclesiastical body in the Presbyterian Church. For a civil court to determine
ecclesiastical questions where a property matter was concerned could
4
only result in compounding the difficulty.'

In affirming the judgment below, the Court made it clear that the
conclusions reached by the General Assembly, as the highest judicatory of the Presbyterian ecclesiastical organization, were to be
considered binding. Hence, the loyalist element of the local congregation stood entitled to possession of the Walnut Street Church property.
While the decision in Watson v. Jones did not rest directly on
constitutional grounds, there were passages in the Supreme Court's
opinion that expressed ideas intimately related to the matter of religious liberty. One was that secular courts would have to regard themselves as bound by the determinations of the ultimate tribunal of an
ecclesiastical organization.'- No court should interfere with the triart. IV, § 2.
'3 At that time, the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)
12U.S. CONST.

was in effect. Not until 1938 did Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
overrule it.
'4 The Court feared the consequences of any procedure that:
[Would in effect transfer to the civil courts where property rights
were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions.
And this is precisely what the Court of Appeals of Kentucky did
in the case of Watson v. Avery, [65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332 (1867)].
Under cover of inquiries into the jurisdiction of the synod and
presbytery over the congregation, and of the General Assembly over
all, it went into an elaborate examination of the principles of Presbyterian Church government, and ended by overruling the decision of
the highest judicatory of that church in the United States, both on
the jurisdiction and the merits; and, substituting its own judgment
for that of the ecclesiastical court, decided that ruling elders, declared
to be such by that tribunal, are not such, and must not be recognized
by the congregation, though four fifths of its members believe in the
judgment of the Assembly and desired to conform to its decree.
THE SutRmum CoURT ON CTmcH AND STATE 19 (J. Tussman ed. 1962).
IsIn this class of cases we think the rule of action which should
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bunal's way of resolving controverted questions over the content or
organization of a religion. Where conflict arose between religious factions as to the control of church property, the jurisdiction of a civil
court might be invoked. Even then, the highest judicatory of the
parent ecclesiastical organization would have to be regarded as the
decisive authority on which party to the intra-church dispute represented the legitimate arm of the church. As such, its claim deserved to
be respected.
In addition to the rule on noninterference with strictly religious
affairs, a meaningful proposition to be acknowledged by the courts of
this country was that there existed full freedom of belief and a right
to practice it so long as no violation of the personal and property
rights of others or the laws of morality was involved.' 6 No such offense
as that of heresy was prosecutable under civil law. People could set up
their own religious tribunals to resolve controversies over what to
believe and establish an ecclesiastical organization to govern the relations between members and officials of the church. These things lay
beyond the reach of the state. The law might be invoked to protect
govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the
relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that,
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
16In his opinion deciding Watson v. Jones, Justice Miller incorporated
these ideas as follows:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious
doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property,
and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The
law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of
any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of
controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the
ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned.
All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would
be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such
religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could
appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the
essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that
those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides

for.

Id. at 728.
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the right to engage in such voluntary religious expression but could
neither channel nor control it. That was a function reserved solely for
7
the church or ecclesiastical organization concerned.
What was said by the Court in Watson v. Jones weighed heavily
in the majority opinion resolving the Kedroff case eighty years later.
The relevance of Watson to Kedroff is of more than passing interest.
It was decided long before the doctrine of incorporation received
judicial approval, so as to render the first amendment's religion clauses
effective against state encroachment through the term "liberty" guaranteed in the due process clause of the fourteenth. Of course, this
assimilation lent an enlarged coercive thrust to the constitutional ban
on laws entailing the establishment of religion or inhibiting the free
exercise thereof.'8
In deciding Kedroff, the Court found time-tested guidelines
previously enunciated in the Watson case. Radiations from that precedent had cast an atmosphere of liberty around organized religion,
rendering it independent of state control and immune from secular
regulation.19 This meant that religious organizations were not manipulable by the state but were able to reach their own decisions. Church
self-government was thereby ensured. The state had no authority to
interfere with the freedom of churches to organize themselves and
determine their own articles of faith. Thanks to the process of incorporation, churches had gained protection under the federal Constitution for their freedom to worship unimpeded by state or local government.
This freedom carried with it the right of churches to choose their
own clergymen. In saying this, Justice Reed added a caveat: The
methods of choice must be above board. An unrestricted right to
select the occupants of pulpits might conceivably depend on the propriety of methods employed. Thus, the majority spokesman in Kedrofi
showed himself cognizant of constitutional protection for a church's
right to pick its own clergy. This right fell within the meaning of
freedom of religion and, as such, enjoyed immunity from state intervention where there was no demonstrable impropriety about its exercise. 0
17Id. at 728-29.
18In his majority opinion in the Kedroff case, Justice Reed made refer-

ence to belated "judicial recognition of the coercive power of the Fourteenth

Amendment to protect the limitations of the First Amendment against state
action." 344 U.S. at 115.
19Id. at 94.
20 Justice Reed wrote: "Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper
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On the theory that the Russian Church in American would
maintain the purity of the Orthodox religion in trust, New York had
sought to justify its legislation transferring control of that religion's
churches in the state to the separatist movement by resort to the
doctrine of cy pres.21 The Court refused to countenance this attempt
to get around the constitutional ban on governmental obstructions to

religious libertyP
The Kedroff case was not to be controlled by a much earlier one
involving the Mormon Church, 23 the crucial elements of which were
nonexistent in the instant controversy. Looking back to the 1890
Mormon Church case, Justice Reed pointed out that it had involved
a property seizure by the United States through escheat procedure
following revocation of the church's charter as a religious corporation
in the Utah Territory. This had occurred as a result of its illegal practices growing out of Mormon advocacy of polygamy. Though the
Utah Territory had confirmed the Church's incorporation, the power
of Congress over federal territories 4 superseded the authority of the
subordinated jurisdiction. Territorial acts were subject to the superior
constitutional power of Congress. Inasmuch as it was a charitable and
religious corporation that was dissolved, its property could be distributed for a beneficent purpose under the cy pres rule. Thus, it might
be given over to the use of Utah's public schools. Such objects of usemethods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal
constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state
interference." Id. at 116.
Justice Reed's reference to "improper methods of choice" was prompted
by the case of Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1
(1929), where the designation of a chaplain was at issue. In that case the
judiciary was asked to determine whether one who claimed a chaplaincy by
virtue of a will could be deprived of such by a decision of the Archbishop
that he was not qualified under canon law. Justice Brandeis in the Court's
opinion declared: "!n the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular
courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract
or otherwise." 280 U.S. at 16.
Justice Frankfurter also addressed himself to this point in the following
words: "[lit is not a function of civil government under our constitutional
system to assure rule to any religious body by a counting of heads. Our
Constitution does assure that anyone is free to worship according to his conscience:' 344 U.S. at 122-23.
21 344 U.S. at 119.
22

Id.

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
'The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States .. . ." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3.
23

24
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fulness, if not charity, were appropriate recipients of benefits derived
from the escheated property in question. 5
What rendered the Mormon Church decision inapplicable was
that the Kedroff situation involved a tranfer of administrative authority over a church to a religious faction rather than the outright
seizure or dissolution of the church's property by government. Therein
lay the crucial difference. It was the state's attempt to shift the locus
of ecclesiastical authority from the parent body of the Orthodox religion to a separatist movement that offended the Constitution. This
shift could be justified only if the court were to find that the separationists represented the true body of thought of the Russian Church
in America and that they were the legal owners by virtue of their
maintenance of the original church purpose. The judiciary was not a
proper tribunal to settle property disputes which rested solely upon the
determination of ecclesiastical doctrine.
This distinction between purely legal controversies, which were
a proper subject for judicial determination, and religious controversies,
which were beyond the realm of the judiciary, weighed heavily upon
Justice Frankfurter.2 6 In a separate opinion, he took the position that
if the issue were capable of being isolated in a property dispute, a
court's obligation was to decide it in line with the ecclesiastical law
prevailing before any schism arose to divide church loyalties.27 It was
Justice Frankfurter's view that any attempt to invest by law the candidate of a schismatic body with sacerdotal authority would invade the
constitutionally protected religious domain of relationships within a
hierarchically structured ecclesiastical organization. For the state to
encroach on an area so obviously off limits to secular authority in25
Speaking for the Court in the 1890 Mormon Church case, Justice
Bradley declared:
The State has a perfect right to prohibit polygamy, and all other
open offenses against the enlightened sentiment of mankind, notwithstanding the pretense of religious conviction by which they may be
advocated and practised ....
And since polygamy has been forbidden by the laws of the United States, under severe penalties, and
since the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has persistently
used and claimed the right to use, and the unincorporated community
still claims the same right to use, the funds with which the late corporation was endowed for the purpose of promoting and propagating
the unlawful practice as an integral part of their religious usages,
the question arises, whether the government, finding these funds
without legal ownership, has or has not, the right, through its courts,
and in due course of administration, to cause them to be seized and
devoted to objects of undoubted charity and usefulness ....
136 U.S. at 50.
26 344 U.S. 94, 121 (1952).
27See note 6 supra.
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evitably invited the discipline of ultimate judicial invalidation under
the fourteenth amendment.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral thus was not to be cordoned off from
the communicants and clergy loyal to the central governing body of
the Orthodox religion, despite a suspicion regarding their loyalty to
America by dint of the mother church's location in Communistdominated Moscow. Justice Frankfurter gave short shrift to the claim
that potential peril to the state could justify legislative divestment of
a church merely because of its ecclesiastical ties to religious organizations in politically hostile foreign countries. The problems which that
would raise should be obvious, considering the possibility of different
solutions by multiple state jurisdictions within a federal system.28
Lessons of the past were scarcely to be ignored in that regard.
With al this in mind, Justice Frankfurter found it impossible to
sanction New York's substitution of its legislative judgment for a far
more qualified assessment of the credentials of the Russian Orthodox
Church under the Moscow patriarchate. American state legislators
were hardly in a position to appraise the validity of claims to the
governance of a church whose ecclesiastical center was located in
another country.29 To do so was presumptuous and even audacious,
without demonstrable justification. In any event, the Constitution
clearly forbade a state to adjudge the validity of ecclesiastical titles.
New York had exceeded secular bounds by trenching on an area
reserved to religion, which alone was qualified to control its own
house. To the same degree that the first amendment placed the
spiritual sphere beyond political control, the fourteenth shunted the
states away from the religious realm. 0 New York had contrived to
enter it and so would have to be pushed out by holding its mandate as
to the disposition of Saint Nicholas Cathedral unconstitutional.
Justice Jackson remained unconvinced, however. In brief compass, he portrayed the background of the church in Russia, showing it
to have been dominated by the state from the start. First, the czar had
28
In rejecting the position taken by the New York Court of Appeals,
Justice Frankfurter used these words:
The consideration which permeates the court's opinion below would
give each State the right to assess the circumstances in the foreign
political entanglements of its religious bodies that make for danger
to the State, and the power, resting on plausible legislative findings,
to divest such bodies of spiritual authority and of the temporal property which symbolizes it.
344 U.S. at 123.
29 1d. at 125.

30 Id. at 126.
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manipulated the church for his own purposes; after the Bolshevicks
had seized power, they also dominated the church. A schism arose
when American communicants differed with the pro-Soviet group
in charge of the church and registered their aversion by launching a
separatist movement.'
In Justice Jackson's opinion, no religious liberty was being impaired by New York's law, which actually served to promote liberty.32
Nothing in New York's law required the denomination concerned to
incorporate under its terms. By seeking incorporation under this law,
the denomination voluntarily subjected its temporal interests, including
the real property of the Cathedral in question, to the state's legal
jurisdiction. This enabled it to take advantage of provisions that
would render it immune from personal liability and extend other practical benefits. Justice Jackson noted that New York's constitution had
empowered the legislature to pass acts of incorporation subject to
subsequent alteration. Of course, this could not be carried to the
point of deprivation of due process of law in disregard of the fourteenth amendment. The state's capacity to exercise the power reserved
to it, while not unlimited, was far reaching. The enactment of the
statute in question amounted to a proper amendment of New York's
Religious Corporations Law. Accordingly, in the exercise of its reserved power over corporations properly classified as religious, New
York was able to convey control of Saint Nicholas Cathedral to the
Russian Church in America. The whole matter could have been disposed of under New York law on this ground alone, said Justice
Jackson.
A property issue that should not have been sublimated into a
religious matter underlay the Kedroff controversy, as Justice Jackson
analyzed it. He insisted that the dedication of the property under
litigation to a religious purpose did not justify bringing it within the
protection of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.33 It
made no sense to him to subordinate a state's law to canonical custom
or ecclesiastical regulation. The supremacy clause made federal law
superior to that of any state. 4 The full faith and credit clause also
might have the effect of requiring state deference to the law of another
jurisdiction, namely that of a sister state.3" There was nothing in the
31 d. at 127.
32

'This statute does not interfere with religious freedom but furthers it."

Id. at 128.

331d. at 130.
34 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
3sU.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
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Constitution, however, that would require a state to defer to the law
of any church. If a state had to give way to canon law, separation of
church and state would become a misnomer. In Justice Jackson's
opinion, majority thinking on the subject within the Kedroff controversy pointed the wrong way.3 6 To subordinate a state's law to an
ecclesiastical rule revealed a misconception of the meaning of separation.
Justice Reed's opinion, speaking for the Court, implied that a
church as a corporate entity possessed a freedom of its own, subject
to direct rather than derivative constitutional protection. The freedom
of the church was something different from that of its members and
could be invoked by the organization itself. Inherently, unlike the
freedom of individuals to believe or disbelieve anything, the liberty
of a church possessed a character and purpose of its own. On the
strength of its reasoning, the Court accorded novel recognition to an
international body of believers whose church government had its home
37
in an alien land.
The Kedroff case called forth a ruling that reaffirmed the principle of nonintervention earlier enunciated in Watson v. Jones. The
effect of this was to fix the idea of nonintervention in the first amendment. The Court identified church-state separation with religious
liberty. On its face, only the issue of church-state separation was involved. Justice Jackson recognized this in his dissent in which he
pointed out that New York had interfered with no one's exercise of
religion.38 Secular authority had not prevented anybody from worshiping the way he wanted. Although the Court's opinion made passing
reference to church-state separation as a factor,3 9 it relied primarily
on religious liberty as the ground for invalidating the challenged
terms of New York's law.40 Where a church organization is riven by a
schism, its supreme judiciary alone can determine which of the con36

"I do not see," Justice Jackson wrote, "how one can spell out of the

principles of separation of church and state a doctrine that a state submit
rights to settlement by canon law." 344 U.S. at 131.
property
37
As to pluralistic aspects of the Saint Nicholas Cathedral controversy,
see related comments in Gilkey, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Freedom of
Religion in Terms of Separation of Church and State, 27 U. KAx. CITY L.

REv. 3 (1958).

38
344 U.S. at 130.
39

As spokesman for the Court, Justice Reed wrote: "Here there is a

transfer by statute of control over churches. This violates our rule of separation between church and state." Id. at 110.
40'This transfer [of property] takes place by virtue of the statute. Such
a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment. It prohibits in this country the
free exercise of religion." Id. at 107.
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tending factions represents the true faith. Civil government has no
alternative but to accept and abide by the judgment of its ecclesiastical
counterpart in matters of faith.
As a result of the remand of the Kedroff case to the New York
Court of Appeals, 41 a later Court had to deal with the ultimate disposition of Saint Nicholas Cathedral. On grounds of common law,
New York's ultimate tribunal came to the same conclusion reached in
its first ruling.42 This led to another reversal by the nation's highest
Court, which held unanimously that the state could not accomplish
judicially what was forbidden to its legislature.4 This case was resolved by holding that the Archbishop who represented Moscow's
patriarch had a right to use and occupy Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
regardless of New York's common law to the contrary. The state
judiciary's determination that Soviet domination of the patriarchate
in Russia precluded the exercise of such a right under domestic
common law amounted to an unconstitutional secular interference
with the government of a church. It impaired the free exercise of
religion by an ecclesiastical organization, contrary to the rationale
of the Kedroff precedent.
Kedroff for the first time phrased the nonintervention principle
of Watson and Gonzales in constitutional terms. Kreshik placed the
same limitation upon the judiciary that Kedroff had placed upon the
legislature. Throughout these cases, there was an ever-present awareness that a proper scope for state intervention exists, even where a
religious organization is a party to the controversy. Mapping this
admittedly limited area of acceptable state action became the problem
of the Warren Court.
In 1968, the Court was presented with a novel approach to
settlement of internal church disputes. The case of Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hall Memorial
Presbyterian Church" provided the occasion. There the Court was
asked to determine whether the constitutional restraints on state
action established in Kedroff permitted a civil court to award church
property on the basis of judicial interpretation of church doctrine.
Two local churches by a vote of their local congregations found that
the church hierarchy had departed from the religious doctrines existing
Id. at 121.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 164 N.E.2d 687,
176 N.Y.S.2d
226 (1959).
43
Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
44393 U.S. 440 (1969).
41

42
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at the time the local churches affiliated with the parent ecclesiastical
body. These local churches filed suits in Georgia Superior Court seeking to enjoin the general church from trespass on the local church
property, title to which was in the local churches. 45 The Georgia court
ruled that "Georgia law implies a trust of local church property for
the benefit of the general church on the sole condition that the general
church adhere to its tenets of faith... at the time of affiliation by the
local churches." 46 The parent body was enjoined from further interference.
Clearly this did not constitute the "counting of heads" concept
rejected in Frankfurter's concurrence in Kedroff;47 it almost paralleled
the "prior ecclesiastical law" concept that Frankfurter had favored.48
The problem lay in whether the judiciary was the proper interpreter
of the ecclesiastical law.
In reversing the Georgia court, the United States Supreme Court
held the "departure-from-doctrine" standard was defective because it
required a "civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion- the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion." 49 By virtue of Watson,
there could be no judicial finding of heresy. To phrase this in the constitutional language of Kedroff: "Even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the church custom
or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls. This under
our Constitution necessarily follows in order that there may be free
exercise of religion."' 5
CONCLUSION

The continuing vitality of Kedroif, as reaffirmed by the Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hall case, stands as a guide to courts confronted with
internal church disputes phrased in legal terms. The mere existence
of a legal question gives the judiciary no license to examine church
doctrine. At the same time, the presence of a factual dispute involving
church property does not prohibit resort to state organs for resolution
of that controversy. The nature of the state action is the decisive
45

Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hall

Memorial Presbyterian Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
46 393 U.S. 440, 443 (1969).
47
See the comments of Justice Frankfurter at note 20 supra.
48 See note 6 supra.
49393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969).
50344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952).
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factor; it must neither establish a religion nor prohibit its free exercise,
but may represent the application of neutral legal principles to secular
aspects of an intra-Church controversy, even though the affected
party may be a religious institution. The continued vitality of Kedrofi
as a guiding light in the application of this standard continues to be
acknowledged. It represents one of the most scholarly examinations
of a continuing dilemma in a society dedicated to both the rule of law
and religious liberty.
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